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SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The Subcommittee makes the following recommendations,
all of which are discussed in detail at the end of the Report:
* The Subcommittee's principal recommendation is that the Second
Circuit should provide its summary orders to the electronic media,
including electronic data base services, in a manner that makes the
orders accessible to the public in the least expensive, most widely
accessible method consistent with the publication of its reported
decisions. The Subcommittee believes that making the summary
orders available electronically will remove the veil of secrecy that
many members of the bar have identified as one of their primary
* ©1996 New York County Lawyers' Association. All Rights Reserved. This
Report was approved by the Board of Directors of New York County Lawyers'
Association at its regular meeting on June 12, 1995.
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concerns about the current rule. They further point out this change
will not impose any significant burdens on the court or on the bar.
* The Second Circuit should provide a more detailed elaboration of
the criteria used by the court in deciding to issue a summary order
decision. The circuit's current Rule 0.23 is relatively vague regard-
ing the standard used to determine whether a decision should be
published or should be issued as a summary order. Most of the other
circuits provide more detail about the criteria used, and the Subcom-
mittee believes that providing more detailed criteria will serve to
reduce the mystery surrounding the rule and its use that has led to
some of the criticism by the bar. Furthermore, providing these crite-
ria will lead to a more uniform application of the rule by the court
itself.
* The Second Circuit should notify counsel that, if counsel disagrees
with the court's decision to issue a summary order in the case, coun-
sel may request that the court publish the order. The court does
publish summary orders occasionally, when it is persuaded that a
useful purpose would be served by publication, and the Subcommit-
tee believes that it would be helpful for all attorneys who receive a
summary order decision to know that the option to make this re-
quest of the court exists.
* The Second Circuit should give additional consideration to
whether to permit citation to summary orders as persuasive authori-
ty when no published decision of the circuit on the issue involved is
available. While a summary order would not ordinarily be rendered
where there is no Second Circuit decision on point (because then a
jurisprudential purpose would be served by a published decision), on
occasion counsel may believe that there is no Second Circuit prece-
dent, and therefore may wish to refer the court to an unpublished
decision as persuasive authority.
I. BACKGROUND
The Joint Subcommittee on the Use of Summary Orders
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
was created to study the Second Circuit's practices with re-
spect to summary orders. The impetus for the formation of the
Subcommittee was a New York Law Journal article which
noted that the circuit's use of this device had increased more
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than 20% from 1990 to 1993.' The article also noted that the
Second Circuit was more restrictive than several other circuits,
which made their summary orders available to the bar via
electronic data base services and permitted attorneys to cite
summary decisions in unrelated cases. The article quoted Sec-
ond Circuit Judge Wilfred Feinberg as stating that the notion
that summary orders are a means for "sweeping tough deci-
sions under the rug [remains] a legitimate concern," and sug-
gesting that the bar periodically review a sample of unpub-
lished cases to ensure that the circuit is properly applying its
own standards. The New York Bar Association last studied the
Second Circuit's summary order practice in 1981, when the
Federal Courts Committee of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York issued a report critical of the Second
Circuit's extensive reliance on the practice.
In response, the New York County Lawyers' Association
Committee on the Federal Courts, chaired by Richard A. Wil-
liamson, and the Appellate Courts Committee, chaired by Alan
'I. Raylesberg, formed a Joint Subcommittee to study the Sec-
ond Circuit's use of summary orders and to compare this
circuit's practice with that of other circuits.
H1. JOINT SUBCOMMTEE ACTv=rY
The Joint Subcommittee, co-chaired by Majorie M. Smith
of the Committee on the Federal Courts and Ravi Batra of the
Appellate Courts Committee, held an initial meeting to discuss
the topic. The Subcommittee decided to collect information on
the practices of other circuits, review the literature on the
practice in the Second Circuit, obtain and review a sample of
summary orders from the Second Circuit and meet with the
circuit Executive to discuss the topic. On February 8, 1995, the
Subcommittee co-chairs and several Subcommittee members
met with circuit Executive Steven Flanders, Court of Appeals
Clerk George Lange III, and Chief Deputy Clerk Carolyn
Campbell to discuss the circuit's summary order practices. On
April 12,,1995, the Subcommittee co-chairs met with Chief
I Edward A. Adams, Increased Use of Unpublished Rulings Faulted, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 2, 1994, at 1.
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Judge Jon 0. Newman. In addition, Subcommittee members
reviewed two months' worth of unpublished summary orders
which were furnished by the clerk's office.
Ill. DISCUSSION
A. Second Circuit Practices Regarding Use of Summary Orders
While there was a period in the 1970s when the Second
Circuit issued summary orders from the bench at the conclu-
sion of argument, that practice stopped by the mid-1980s.2
Since then, the circuit has issued written summary orders,
which range in length from a few paragraphs to several pag-
es.
3
1. Content of Second Circuit Rule
The rule providing for disposition by summary order is
Second Circuit Rule 0.23, captioned "Dispositions in Open
Court or by Summary Order." It states:
The demands of an expanding caseload require the court to be
ever conscious of the need to utilize judicial time effectively. Accord-
ingly, in those cases in which decision is unanimous and each judge
of the panel believes that no jurisprudential purpose would be served
by a written opinion, disposition will be made in open court or by
summary order.
Where a decision is rendered from the bench, the court may
deliver a brief oral statement, the record of which is available to
counsel upon request and payment of transcription charges. Where
disposition is by summary order, the court may append a brief writ
ten statement to that order. Since these statements do not constitute
2 According to senior Second Circuit Judge George Pratt, in 1975 70% of the
dispositions under Rule 0.23 were oral decisions, but by 1984 only 1% of summary
order decisions were oral. George Pratt, Foreword, Summary Orders in the Second
Circuit under Rule 0.23, 51 BROOK. L. REv. 479, 484 (1985). The practice fell into
disuse because it was distasteful to arguing counsel, and because it suggested that
oral argument was a mere formality.
s Judge Pratt observed that "[t]he longer summary orders read much like the
circuit's per curiam opinions or the shorter signed opinions," although the shorter
summary orders may be as short as a sentence or as long as a paragraph in
length. Summary orders are available at the clerk's office, and the Federal Report-
er service publishes a notation of whether a case decided by summary order was
affirmed or reversed, remanded or otherwise disposed of. Pratt, supra note 2, at
481.
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formal opinions of the court and are unreported and not uniformly
available to all parties, they shall not be cited or otherwise used in
unrelated cases before this court.4
The circuit adopted its rule in 1973, in response to sugges-
tions that the federal courts limit the number and length of
published opinions.' Chief Judge Jon 0. Newman explained
that summary orders are employed when an appeal involves a
frivolous legal issue or when a case can be decided by referring
to a previous Second Circuit decision.6 Judge Thomas Meskill
has written that a panel considering whether to issue a pub-
lished opinion or a summary order asks "will a published opin-
ion in this case be helpful to the bench or bar generally or will
it add anything to the established law of the circuit?'
The use of summary orders has also been explained as a
necessary reaction to the burgeoning caseload of the Second
Circuit, which went from 1,739 cases in 1975 to 3,528 in
1990,8 over a 100% increase, whereas the number of autho-
rized judges increased only from nine to thirteen during the
same period. Since judging is a deliberative process, it is im-
possible for each judge to be responsible for more than a cer-
tain number of signed opinions each year. The decision of cases
by summary orders is thus a concomitant of the court's grow-
ing per-judge caseload.9
The Second Circuit's use of summary orders is consistent
with a 1994 recommendation of the Committee on Long Range
Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
which urges that
publication of opinions should be restricted to those of precedential
import. Not all appellate decisions warrant publication. Opinions
prepared for publication tend to take considerably more judicial and
4 2D CIL I. 0.23 (emphasis added).
'In 1964, the Judicial Conference of the United States adopted a resolution
asking judges of the district courts and courts of appeals to "authorize the publica-
tion of only those opinions which are of general precedential value and that opin-
ions authorized to be published be succinct. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMN1SAIM=
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1964 ANNUAL REPORT 11.
6 Adams, supra note 1.
Thomas J. Maesldll, Foreword, Caseload Growth. Struggling to Keep Pace, 57
BROOK. L. REv. 299, 304 (1991).
In 1993, there were 4,321 appeals; in 1994, there were 3,986.
' Meskill, supra note 6, at 303.
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law clerk time than opinions not prepared for publication. In addi-
tion the proliferation of published opinions may increase the likeli-
hood of conflicting interpretations of circuit law ...."
2. Quantity of Summary Order Dispositions
The Second Circuit's use of summary orders has fluctuated
over the past several years, from a low of 58% of total deci-
sions in 1991" to a high of 63% in 1993 and 1994.12 The pro
se portion of the court of appeals' docket is responsible for a
disproportionate number of summary orders; according to Chief
Judge Newman, pro se appeals frequently are "frivolous and
present no issue meriting publication." 3 If pro se cases are
removed from the statistics, the percentage of summary order
dispositions has actually declined over the past two years (from
54% in 1993 to 50% in 1994); and was the same in 1994 as it
was in 1991.
At least as of 1985,14 and presumably up to the present,
summary orders are overwhelmingly used to affirm lower court
decisions." If the district court has written an opinion whose
reasoning is acceptable to the panel, the summary order's
explanation of the circuit's decision will often be limited to the
one line: "Affirmed substantially on the basis of the opinion
10 COMIHllTIEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 51 (Draft for
Public Comment No. 36D, Nov. 1994).
" The annual figures are based on the statistical year for the federal courts,
which runs from October to October. Some of the statistics in this Report were
provided to the Subcommittee by the Clerk of the Second Circuit, George Lange
III, for which the Subcommittee is grateful.
12 The City Bar Association's 1991 Report stated that in 1969 summary orders
constituted approximately 25% of the total decisions of the court. Pratt, supra note
2, at 489.
13 In a letter to the New York Law Journal published on August 25, 1994
[hereinafter Newman Letter], Chief Judge Jon 0. Newman attributed any increase
in unpublished opinions (also known as summary orders) to the increase in the
number of pro se cases on the court's docket. The pro se docket has ranged from
20% of the court's total caseload in 1991, to 31% in 1994. Of the pro se cases, the
overwhelming majority are decided by summary order, ranging from 88% in 1991
to 93% in 1994.
14 See Pratt, supra note 2, at 479.
11 According to Chief Judge Newman, during the 1989-1991 period, only 3% of
summary orders involved reversals (defining a reversal as any alteration of the
district court's judgment), compared to a reversal rate of 46% when published
opinions alone were considered. Jon 0. Newman, A Study of Appellate Reversals,
58 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 632 (1992).
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below." Chief Judge Newman noted that when the court issues
a summary order affirming on the basis of the district court's
decision, the affirmance does not take on the status of "law of
the circuit."
16
3. Quality and Appropriateness of Summary Orders in
Particular Cases
The quality and appropriateness of summary orders are
obviously much more difficult to evaluate. Indeed, the Subcom-
mittee believes that the bar is not well-positioned to assess the
appropriateness of summary orders in particular cases. Sum-
mary orders by their nature contain only an abbreviated dis-
cussion of the facts of the particular case and a conclusory
discussion of the applicable law. It is therefore generally im-
possible to tell from the four corners of the decision whether
the case meets the Rule 0.23 standard that "no jurisprudential
purpose would be served by a written opinion," because the
law applicable to the facts of the case is well-settled.'7
Interestingly, the 1994 New York Law Journal study sup-
ports the view that different Second Circuit judges may have
different perceptions of which cases do not involve issues of
precedential or other jurisprudential significance. The Law
Journal study concluded, for example, that in 55% of the cases
heard by panels which included Judge Oakes, a published
decision was issued; in contrast, only 26% of the cases heard
by panels including Judge Jacobs resulted in a published opin-
ion. Judge Oakes said that he is "a great believer in the pub-
lished opinion, because it exposes your reasoning to the light of
day."8 Judge Cardamone, who also had a high publication
rate, said that it was the court's duty to explain "why we de-
cide as we do."19
16 Joint Subcommittee Meeting, Apr. 12, 1995.
17 Chief Judge Newman observed that the bulk of the time saved in deciding a
case by summary order derives from the reduced attention the panel can give to
the facts, since the parties who receive the decision will be familiar with the facts;
in published opinions, the panel will usually devote a substantial portion of the
opinion to a statement of the underlying facts. Id.
" Edward A. Adams, Tendency to Issue Published Rulings, N.Y. LJ., Aug. 3,
1994, at 8.
,9 The New York Law Journal study of Second Circuit rulings was conducted
over a nine-month period and involved a review of every case decided by the Sec-
1996]
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After considering the subject carefully, the Subcommittee
has concluded that the only way the bar could evaluate sensi-
bly the appropriateness of the use of summary orders in partic-
ular cases would be to read the briefs, examine the record and
perhaps speak with counsel to ascertain whether they thought
the case involved issues that warranted a published opinion.
Without such an in-depth evaluation, it is impossible to con-
clude whether the circuit is using summary orders in cases
where such use is not justified, even if the percentage of cases
decided by summary order increases from one year to the next.
What can be said, however, is that the percentage of counseled
cases decided by summary order has not fluctuated significant-
ly over at least the past several years, ranging from a low of
50% (in 1991 and 1994) to a high of 54% (in 1993).
The Subcommittee notes that George Yankwitt, former
President of the Federal Bar Council, has stated that he "can-
not accept the proposition that 63 percent of [Second Circuit]
appeals are routine mundane matters."0 The Subcommittee
disagrees with the notion that there is some percentage of
summary order decisions that is necessarily "appropriate" and
anything above that percentage excessive. At the same time,
the Subcommittee is concerned about the high percentage of
cases being decided by summary order. The Subcommittee
believes that implementation of its recommendations, set forth
below, for changes in current practice will help to insure that
the summary order rule is being applied in appropriate circum-
stances and will enhance the bar's understanding of the
circuit's practice.
4. Citation and Publication of Summary Orders through
Electronic Data Bases
Since promulgation of Rule 0.23 in 1973, the circuit has
prohibited attorneys from referring to summary orders in unre-
lated cases. The rationale for this prohibition is two-fold: (1)
since the orders are supposed to be utilized only when the case
presents no issues having precedential importance, there is no
ond Circuit from 1989 through 1993, a total of 5,681 cases. Id.
20 Edward A. Adams, Lawyers Object to Increased Use of Summary Orders,
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 2, 1994, at 4.
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reason to cite to them; and (2) although the orders are avail-
able in the court's files, they are unpublished, and therefore
permitting citation would unfairly advantage institutional liti-
gants, such as the United States Attorney's offices, which have
access to large numbers of the orders.2 The circuit does per-
mit anyone to petition to have a summary order published, and
it reportedly publishes a handful of orders each year that have
been the subject of such requests.'
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals does not make sum-
mary orders available to the electronic data base services such
as Westlaw and LEXIS.
B. Other Circuits' Practices Regarding Use of Summary Orders
All circuits have adopted plans allowing for unpublished
opinions, embodied in circuit rules; some circuits have publica-
tion plans in addition to circuit rules.
1. Content of Summary Order Rules
The Second Circuit's rule is relatively vague on the stan-
dard for determining whether an opinion should be published.
This vagueness has been noted as a controversial feature of the
rule.' Almost all the other circuits provide more detail about
the considerations that go into a decision to publish.24 For
example, the First Circuit's rule states: "If a district court opin-
21 According to Judge Pratt, "Because the orders are unpublished... they are
largely unexamined except by the parties to the case.' Pratt, supra note 2, at 482.
"Chief Judge Newman's letter to the New York Law Journal stated that the
court stood ready to entertain a motion to publish a summary order in any case
where publication would be useful. Newman Letter, supra note 13, at 2. Judge
Pratt has also noted the possibility of publishing an initially unpublished summary
order, which "may come at the request of counsel who were not involved in the
case at all who argue that they wish to quote from an order in connection with a
petition for certiorari in a different case. (Or] the panel originally adopting the
summary order... may decide that publication is appropriate, either because the
panel finds in a later case that it wants to refer to its earlier order, or because of
second thoughts on the 'importance of the case. ' Judge Pratt stated that a LEXIS
search turned up a dozen cases between 1980 and 1985 in which a published
opinion noted that the case had first been decided by summary order. Pratt, supra
note 2, at 486-87.
' Pratt, supra note 2, at 483.
24 See infra Appendix.
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ion has been published, the order of court upon review shall be
published even when the court does not publish an opinion."2
5
The Fourth Circuit's rule states:
Opinions will be published only if they satisfy one or more of the
standards of publication: i) it establishes, alters, modifies, or ex-
plains a rule of law within this circuit; ii) it involves a legal issue of
continuing public interest; iii) it criticizes existing law; iv) it con-
tains an historical review of a legal rule that is not duplicative; v) it
resolves a conflict between panels of this Court or creates a conflict
with a decision in another circuit.
26
2. Citation and Publication of Summary Orders
Six of the thirteen circuits (the First, Seventh, Eighth,
Ninth, D.C. and Federal Circuits) impose the same or similar
limitations on citation as the Second Circuit. The other six
circuits do not prohibit citation of unpublished opinions in
unrelated cases, although the Fourth, Fifth27 and Sixth Cir-
cuits disfavor the practice except when it is used to establish
res judicata, collateral estoppel and the law of the case.28 Two
circuits (the Third and Eleventh) have no rules addressing the
citation question. Only the Tenth Circuit specifically allows
unrestricted citation as "persuasive authority."29 When a cir-
cuit does allow citation in an unrelated case, its rules usually
require that a copy of the cited opinion be served on other par-
ties and filed with the court.30
Judicial accountability is a prime reason the Sixth Circuit
allows attorneys to cite unpublished opinions, according to
Chief Judge Gilbert Merritt."' "The public should have some
kind of access to [all of the circuit's decisions] if for no other
reason than to keep judges on their toes."32 In 1994, the
Tenth Circuit changed its policy to allow citation to unpub-
IsW Cm. R. 36.2(b)(5).
26 4TH Cm. R. 36.2(b)(5), Note.
' The Fifth Circuit's Rule 47.5.3 states that citation of unpublished opinions is
normally allowed only in support of claims of res judicata, collateral estoppel or
the law of the case, or in situations where the case involves related facts.
21 See infra Appendix Question 5.
See infra Appendix Question 5.
"See infra Appendix Question 5.
'1 Adams, supra note 1, at 4.
12 Adams, supra note 1, at 4.
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lished decisions.' Tenth Circuit Chief Judge Stephanie
Seymour said limiting unpublished decisions to those with no
precedential value "is the theory but it's not always the prac-
tice. Some turn out to have precedential value even when the
panel of judges thought they didn't."' As a result of the
Tenth Circuit's change, its unpublished rulings can be cited if
"the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue.'
Unpublished decisions by most circuits are available from
the computerized data bases LEXIS and Westlaw. Only four
circuits, including the Second Circuit, do not make unpub-
lished decisions available to the electronic data base servic-
es.
36
C. Critique of Second Circuit Rule and Practice
A number of criticisms have been made of the Second
Circuit's rule and practices concerning summary orders, begin-
ning with the criticism by the City Bar Association's Federal
Courts Committee in its 1982 report.' The criticisms fall into
the following categories:
* Some counsel feel that their time invested in the ap-
peal and their client's expense merit more in the way of an end
product."
* The proscription on publication and citation of sum-
mary orders deprives the bar of useful material, because any
circuit decision provides insight as to the circuit's thinking and
might assist a practitioner briefing an issue which has been
dealt with by summary order.39 Even though published deci-
sions deal with the same point of law (otherwise the summary
Adams, supra note 1, at 4.
"Adams, supra note 1, at 4.
Adams, supra note 1, at 4.
36 Adams, supra note 1, at 5.
7 The Committee concluded that the increasing use of summary orders was
"an unacceptable 'means of saving judicial time,' in part because a legal doctrine
'derives its power to shape conduct not only from its persuasive articulation in a
single appellate opinion, but also from its repeated application to a wide variety of
real situations' in other cases." Adams, supra note 1, at 5.
.Judge Meskill noted this complaint in Caseload Growth. Mesk" supra note
6, at 304.
"Judge Pratt wrote that some would argue that "any summary order, no
matter how routine, provides significant information about how particular legal
principles are applied to particular situations." Pratt, supra note 2, at 49L
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order would not meet the rule's standard of having no
precedential value), the bar would find it helpful to see how
many times an issue has been decided by the court. If an issue
has been dealt with on numerous occasions via summary or-
ders, counsel may decide that it is not worth briefing the issue
in the current case.
0 While there are decisions that may have no
precedential or other jurisprudential importance, no panel can
tell when it is deciding a case if future events will confirm that
the decision was correctly viewed as being of this type. For
example, in areas where there is recurring district court litiga-
tion, it might be useful to have a published opinion, even if
only an af=ance based "substantially upon the opinion of the
court below," since the summary order resolution of a case
would not create a precedent for application by the district
court.
* Although a decision may not establish or modify a rule
of law within the circuit, the court's application of a well-es-
tablished rule to a particular set of facts may be significant to
litigants in a similar case. Indeed, the very fact that the court
thought that the application of a rule of law to a new set of
facts was so obvious that a summary order could be used may
itself help a practitioner to understand better how that rule of
law will be applied in subsequent cases.
* The use of summary orders tends to impose a "veil of
secrecy" over a significant portion of the circuit's work, "gener-
ates distrust for the whole system and deprives the court of
desirable feedback on its work.' ° A variant of this objection is
that the use of summary orders makes it possible for the court
to avoid exposing to the "light of day" decisions that it does not
want the bar or public to know of. As Judge Pratt put it, the
summary order process gives rise to a concern about "inten-
tional or careless abuse in using Rule 0.23's power to 'hide,' or
to make relatively inaccessible, a decision or the considerations
which have gone into a decision."
40 Pratt, supra note 2, at 492.
41 Pratt, supra note 2, at 490.
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* The non-publication rule gives an unwarranted advan-
tage to institutional litigants like the U.S. Attorney's office,
which can compile large numbers of summary orders in cases
it handled.
* The summary affirmance of a district courts published
opinion gives rise to speculation about whether the circuit
adopted the district court's reasoning without the bar being
readily able to check on whether this is so.
& The court's prohibition of citation of summary orders
should be revised to allow the bar to cite to summary orders,
provided that a copy of the cited order is served and filed.
Citation might be permitted with the proviso that a summary
order is only a "non-binding example" of what the court did
when faced with a similar issue.
• The court should spell out in greater detail, as most of
the other circuits do, the criteria used to determine whether a
case should be decided by summary order.
D. The Circuit's Reaction
* Chief Judge Newman's response to the suggestion that
unpublished opinions are "a great place to hide difficult cases"
was that it was an unfair aspersion, since there had been no
citation by anyone to "a single example of 'hiding' a 'difficult'
case in an unpublished order."2 Moreover, if there is a ten-
dency to abuse the summary order device by sliding over trou-
blesome issues, pressure from circuit colleagues should be
sufficient to prevent judges from succumbing.' Chief Judge
Newman pointed out that some years ago the court had invited
a responsible bar association to analyze two years' worth of
summary orders and identify any they thought should have
been published, and they came up with "barely a handful. '
Newman Letter, supra note 13, at 2.
Pratt, supra note 2, at 496.
Chief Newman Letter, supra note 13, at 2. Judge Newman went on: "After
looking at five years' worth of summary orders, your reporters identified as worthy
of publication only two summary orders, both of which were considered by the Su-
preme Court Yet in both instances, the summary order relied on a previously




* Since the overwhelming number of summary orders
deal only with routine, run-of-the-mill cases, it is unlikely that
institutional litigants have any tremendous advantage by vir-
tue of their being in receipt of large numbers of such orders.
* With respect to the lack of specificity of the Second
Circuit's summary order Rule 0.23, Judge Pratt acknowledged
that perhaps "publishing a longer and more detailed explana-
tion of [what the] jurisprudential purpose" language of Rule
0.23 means would be worthwhile "as part of a circuit plan for
implementing Rule 0.23, or as an amendment to the rule it-
self," since it would enable the bar to "better understand why
certain cases either did or did not go by summary order, and
some judges' conceptions of how 'jurisprudential purpose'
should be interpreted might also be affected."45 But at least as
of 1985, most circuit judges thought that Rule 0.23's "jurispru-
dential purpose" standard was much the same as the longer
rule promulgated by other circuits.46
* The court's fundamental objection to either publishing
or allowing citation of summary orders in unrelated cases is
that both of these changes are perceived as requiring a signifi-
cant adjustment in the way that summary orders are written.
-If summary orders could be citable as precedent, "there
would be an unacceptable risk of panels creating precedents
through [the] use of simplified generalizations of black-letter
law or... imprecise language, which could come back to haunt
the court at a later date ....
-If summary orders were published, the court would need
to polish more carefully the order and include more detail
about the factual background of a case, which would entail "an
immense and unacceptable time cost. . . .One of the major
purposes of using summary orders is to speed up the appellate
process; taking more time to write them would largely defeat
that purpose." 8
• Chief Judge Newmaif has suggested that publication
of all summary orders would "inundate the bar with more
Pratt, supra note 2, at 497-98.
" Pratt, supra note 2, at 497-98.
" Pratt, supra note 2, at 494.
Pratt, supra note 2, at 494.
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material than they can possibly read. It is doubtful that they
can digest the high volume of published opinions" that exists
now.49 Along the same lines, Judge Pratt wrote:
[Iff summary orders add little or nothing to the development of the
law, it would be inefficient to publish them. They would simply
double the number of decisions published each year and therefore
the number of cases to be researched by attorneys and courts. The
added time costs for finding and reading summary orders in a given
area of the law would probably exceed any benefits that might be
gined.'
0 With specific regard to making summary orders avail-
able to Westlaw and LEXIS, Judge Oakes mentioned that one
reason not to do so is that it would give an advantage to larger
firms; he thought it would also tend to lengthen already overly
long briefs."' Chief Judge Newman'is reported to have said
that "if every decision of the court were on-line, attorneys
would have difficulty keeping up with the courtes output."'
IV. SUBCOMMIITEE RECOMIENDATIONS
Based on its study, the Joint Subcommittee makes the
following recommendations:
1. The Joint Subcommittee's primary recommendation is
that the Second Circuit make its summary orders available to
the electronic media, including electronic data base services, in
a manner that makes the orders accessible to the public in the
least expensive, most widely accessible method consistent with
the publication of its reported decisions.'
2. The Subcommittee also favors some elaboration on the
criteria used in deciding to issue a summary order decision,
such as the criteria used by the Fourth Circuit.' The Sub-
' Newman Letter, supra note 13, at 2. Judge Meskill similarly observed that
the non-publication of summary orders was probably welcomed by Federal Reporter
series purchasers since it reduced the number of volumes published and hence the
expense.
' Pratt, supra note 13, at 494.
81 Judge Oakes's address at a joint meeting of the New York County Lawyers'
Association Committee on the Federal Courts and the Appellate Courts Committee,
Oct. 10, 1994.
Adams, supra note 1, at 4.
,See infra pp. 800-03.
See infra Appendix Question 4.
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committee believes that having more detailed criteria will
serve a two-fold purpose: it will educate the bar as to when a
summary order is deemed appropriate by the court, and as
Judge Pratt observed, it might affect "some judges' conceptions
of how 'jurisprudential purpose' should be interpreted" in de-
ciding whether a decision should be by summary order.5
3. The Subcommittee also recommends that the circuit
consider adopting the First Circuit's practice of publishing a
brief order in cases where the circuit is affirming a district
court opinion that has been published.
4. The Subcommittee also favors advising counsel, in cases
decided by summary order, that they can request that the
order be published and of the criteria applied by the court in
deciding whether to grant such requests.
5. The Subcommittee recommends that the circuit give
additional consideration to whether to permit citation of sum-
mary orders, along the lines of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth or
Tenth Circuits' rules. In the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Circuits,
summary orders may be cited, although citation is disfavored
except to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel or the law
of the case; if an unpublished opinion is cited, copies of the
order must be served and filed. The Tenth Circuit permits
unrestricted citation, with the same requirement that the or-
der be served and filed. Particularly in a case where a summa-
ry order has been rendered and counsel believes that there is
no Second Circuit decision on point, counsel may wish to refer
the court to an unpublished decision as persuasive, not bind-
ing, authority.
6. Except as reflected in the above recommendations, the
Subcommittee does not believe it practicable, or even necessar-
ily desirable, for the circuit to alter its use of summary orders
in cases meeting the Rule 0.23 criteria.
To elaborate on the Subcommittee's first recommendation
(which calls for making Second Circuit summary orders avail-
able "on-line"), the Subcommittee believes that the Second
Circuit last considered whether to make its decisions available
to the electronic data base services Westlaw and LEXIS in the
1980s. Since then, use of these services has become much more
widespread, extending to small firms and solo practitioners. 56
' Pratt, supra note 2, at 498.
5' See, e.g., Richard Sloan, Automation in the Law Library of Today, N.Y. L.J.,
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This change reduces the validity of the concern that providing
summary orders to Westlaw and LEXIS would discriminate in
favor of large firms or wealthier attorneys and their clients. In-
deed, the circuit now makes significant use of Westlaw and
LEXIS, citing to district court opinions available only on these
data bases, or using them as research tools and incorporating
the results into the court's opinions.'
Making summary orders available through Westlaw and
LEXIS should not require any change in the court's prepara-
tion of these orders. The decisions of the other circuits that
make their summary decisions available on-line appear to be
no more "polished" than this circuit's summary orders. Making
the Second Circuit's summary orders available to LEXIS and
Westlaw would make them more available to the bar, without
requiring the court to lter its style of writing these orders.
Nor would the circuit need to alter its rule prohibiting
citation of summary orders in unrelated cases. Summary deci-
sions appear in LEXIS or Westlaw with a heading at the top of
the first page advising attorneys of that circuit's rule. For
example, Westlaw includes the following notice before the
Sixth Circuit's summary decisions:
37 F.3d 1498 (Table) Unpublished Disposition
NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpub-
lished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of
copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.
(The decision of the Court is referenced in a 'Table of Decisions
Without Reported Opinions" appearing in the Federal Reporter.)
Feb. 28, 1995, at 5-6. The article noted:
Fifty years ago, library machines consisted of a manually operated
typewriter and a telephone. The IBM electrics came later. Copiers did
not exist ....
Basic research was conducted then, and at least until 1975 or 1980,
mainly through West digests, legal encyclopedias, law reviews, treatise
and statutory compilations.
By contrast today, most library management routines are handled
through computers, as is much legal research-chiefly with Lexis and
Westlaw. The computer revolution in large firms and small is no longer
a prophecy. It is here.
See, eg., United States v. Moetamedi, 46 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing the
unpublished district court opinion as "see Moetamedi, 1993 WVL 147461 at 5").
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The Tenth Circuit's summary decisions are preceded by the
following Westlaw notice:
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains
unfavored, unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has
persuasive value on a material issue, and a copy is attached to the
citing document or, if cited in oral argument, copies are furnished to
the Court and all parties. See General Order of November 29, 1993,
suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or further
order.
Lastly, concern that the court and counsel will be inun-
dated if summary orders are provided to the electronic services
seems overstated. Both Westlaw and LEXIS permit searches to
be conducted either for all decisions of a particular court, or for
published decisions only.5" Nor would making summary or-
ders available on-line result in longer briefs, since parties will
continue to be precluded from citing the orders in unrelated
cases, unless the circuit alters Rule 0.23.
Making summary orders available to, inter alia, Westlaw
and LEXIS would have the following positive effects:
- It virtually would eliminate the concern that the cir-
cuit is "hiding" decisions of difficult issues through its use of
the summary order format; with electronic publication, the
decisions will move from being relatively hidden (in court files
at Foley Square) to being easily accessible (accessing summary
orders on Westlaw or LEXIS is undeniably easier than travel-
ling to the Court of Appeals and poring through uncategorized
case files).
- By making the order readily available, attorneys in
other cases would be able to request publication of a decision.
Generally, litigants in a case have little or no interest in ob-
taining publication of a decision for use in future cases, while
future litigants remain unaware that the circuit has issued a
decision that may be relevant to their case.
- It would enable attorneys to learn easily the basis for
an unpublished affirmance of a district court published opin-
ion.
" For example, using Westlaw to search the Court of Appeals (CTAn) data
base, the attorney would add the following 'but notr limitation at the end of his
or her query: % ci(not unreport! unpub!). To limit district court searches to pub-
lished opinions, the command "dct" immediately followed by "r" (for restricted)
would be used.
[Vol. 62.:785
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- It would make the bar more aware of issues that have
been the subject of frequent unpublished decisions, providing
counsel with a better sense of which issues the court is unlike-
ly to be interested in revisiting.
POSTSCRIPT
The Joint Subcommittee acknowledges and expresses its
appreciation for the cooperation of the Second Circuit, its Chief
Judge, Jon 0. Newman, its Circuit Executive, Steven Flanders,
its Clerk, George Lange III, and its Chief Deputy Clerk, Caro-
lyn Campbell, given to the Joint Subcommittee in its study.
Karen G. Leslie, a member of the Association, submitted a
dissent from the draft report in the form that it was presented




OPINIONS 1985 & 1994
QUESTION 1
What rule or plan covers unpublished opinions?
1st Circuit 1985 - Circuit rule 14; plan in appendix I.B to
rules
1994 - Rules 36.2 and 2
2nd Circuit 1985 - Circuit rule 0.23
1994 - Same
3rd Circuit 1985 - Appendix 1 to rules (chapters V and VI) of
Internal Operating Procedures [hereinafter
IOP'
1994 - Appendix 1, lOP, chapters 5 and 6
4th Circuit 1985 - Circuit rule 18
1994 - IOP 36, 3-6
5th Circuit 1985 - Circuit rule 47.5
1994 - Same
6th Circuit 1985 - Circuit rule 24
1994 - Same
7th Circuit 1985 - Circuit rule 35
1994 - Circuit rule 53
8th Circuit 1985 - Circuit rule 8(i); plan in appendix II to
rules
1994 - Circuit rule 28A(k); appendix I
9th Circuit 1985 - Circuit rule 21
1994 - Circuit rules 36-1 through 5
10th Circuit 1985 - Circuit rule 17
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1985 - Circuit rule 25
1994 - Circuit rules 36-1 through 2
1985 - Circuit rules 13 and 8(f)
1994 - Rule 36
1985 - Circuit rule 18
1994 - Circuit rule 47.6
QUESTION 2
Who makes the decision to publish an opinion?
1st Circuit 1985 - Majority vote of panel
1994 - Any judge can require publication; any
interested person or party can request
publication
2nd Circuit 1985 - Unanimous panel required for non-
publication
1994 - Same
3rd Circuit 1985 - Majority of panel decides whether a per
curiam or signed opinion should be
published; unanimous panel required for a
'judgment order," which is never published
(IOP 6.1)
1994 - Same
4th Circuit 1985 - Author or majority of judges joining the
opinion
1994 - Unanimous panel required for non-
publication
5th Circuit 1985 - Unanimous panel required for non-
publication
1994 - Same
6th Circuit 1985 - Majority of panel determines publication
1994 - Same
7th Circuit 1985 - Majority of panel determines publication
1994 - Same
8th Circuit 1985 - Court, panel or author
1994 - Same
9th Circuit 1985 - Majority of panel
1994 - Same
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
10th Circuit 1985 - Court or panel
1994 - Same
11th Circuit 1985 - Court
1994 - Same
D.C. Circuit 1985 - No rule addresses the question
1994 - Same
Fed. Circuit 1985 - No rule addresses the question
1994 - Same
QUESTION 3
Can a single judge publish a separate opinion?
1st Circuit 1985 - No
1994 - Same
2nd Circuit 1985 - No
1994 - Same
3rd Circuit 1985 - No
1994 - Same
4th Circuit 1985 - No
1994 - Same
5th Circuit 1985 - No
1994 - Same
6th Circuit 1985 - No
1994 - Same
7thCircuit 1985 - Yes
1994 - Same
8th Circuit 1985 - Yes
1994 - Same
9th Circuit 1985 - Author of separate opinion can request
publication
1994 - Same
10th Circuit 1985 - No
1994 - Same
11th Circuit 1985 - No
1994 - Same
D.C. Circuit 1985 - Yes
1994 - Rule does not address the question
Fed. Circuit 1985 - No rule addresses the question
1994 - Same
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QUESTION 4
How detailed are the criteria for deciding
whether to publish an opinion or order?
1st Circuit 1985 - Detailed criteria not provided
1994 - Rule 36.2(a). Somewhat detailed criteria
provided. Note: If a district court opinion
has been published, the order of court upon
review shall be published even when court
does not publish an opinion. Rule
36.2(b)(5)
2nd Circuit 1985 - Detailed criteria not provided
1994 - In those cases in which decision is
unanimous and each judge of the panel
believes that no jurisprudential purpose
would be served by an opinion, disposition
will be made in open court or by summary
order
3rd Circuit 1985 - Detailed criteria not provided
1994 - Same
4th Circuit 1985 - Detailed criteria
1994 - Opinions will be published only if they
satisfy one or more of the standards of
publication: i) it establishes, alters,
modifies, or explains a rule of law within
this circuit; ii) it involves a legal issue of
continuing public interest; iii) it criticizes
existing law; iv) it contains a historical
review of a legal rule that is not
duplicative; v) it resolves a conflict between
panels of this court or creates a conflict
with a decision in another circuit
5th Circuit 1985 - Detailed criteria
1994 - Same
6th Circuit 1985 - Detailed criteria
1994 - Same
7th Circuit 1985 - Detailed criteria
1994 - Same




9th Circuit 1985 - Detailed criteria
1994 - Same
10th Circuit 1985 - Moderately detailed criteria
1994 - Same
11th Circuit 1985 - Moderately detailed criteria
1994 - Same
D.C. Circuit 1985 - Detailed criteria
1994 - Same
Fed. Circuit 1985 - Detailed criteria not provided
1994 - Same
QUESTION 5






1985 - Rule 14: "never to be cited in unrelated
cases." App. I.B(b)(6): "Only published
opinions may be cited."
1994 - "IN]ot to be cited in unrelated cases." "Only
published opinions may be cited otherwise."
1985 - Only in related cases
1994 - Same
1985 - No rule addresses the question
1994 - No rule addresses the question, although
IOP 5.6 states that because only published
opinions have precedential value, the court
does not cite to its unpublished opinions as
authority
1985 - Yes, but it is disfavored "except for the
purpose of establishing res judicata,
estoppel, or the law of the case"; if an
unpublished opinion is cited, copies must
be served and filed
1994 - Same
1985 - Yes, although "normally" only for purposes
of res judicata, collateral estoppel, the law
of the case, or where facts are related; if
cited, copies must be attached to brief
1994 - Same
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6th Circuit 1985 - Yes, but citation is disfavored "except for
the purpose of establishing res judicata,
estoppel, or the law of the case"; if an
unpublished opinion is cited, a copy must
be served and filed
1994 - Same
7th Circuit 1985 - Only for the purposes of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, and the law of the case
1994 - Same
8th Circuit 1985 - Citation prohibited "except when the cases
are related by virtue of an identity between
the parties or the causes of action"
1994 - Same
9th Circuit 1985 - Only "when relevant under the doctrine"
of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the
law of the case
1994 - Same
10th Circuit 1985 - Yes, citation allowed; if an unpublished
opinion is cited a copy must be served upon
opposing counsel
1994 - Per general order of the Court of Appeals
to December 31, 1995 or until further order
of the Court. Citation copy allowed; if an
unpublished opinion is cited a copy must be
served upon opposing counsel
11th Circuit 1985 - No rule addresses the question
1994 - Unpublished opinions may be cited as
persuasive authority provided that a copy
of the opinion is attached to brief
D.C. Circuit 1985 - Rule 8(f): citation permitted 'for such
purposes" as res judicata, collateral
estoppel, and the law of the case
1994 - Rule does not address the question
Fed. Circuit 1985 - Only for purposes of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, and the law of the case
1994 - Same
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